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OPINION 
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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 The Hayes family receives enhanced voucher rental 
assistance from the federal government, and a federal statute 
provides that enhanced voucher holders “may elect to remain” 
in their housing developments, even after their landlord has 
opted out of the federal housing assistance program.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(t)(1)(B).  But the Hayes family’s landlord, Appellee 
Philip Harvey, contends that this statutory right to “elect to 
remain” does not apply at the end of a lease term.  Thus, 
according to Harvey, he is permitted to evict the Hayes family 
without cause once their lease has expired.  The District Court 
agreed and granted Harvey’s motion for summary judgment.  
We will reverse, however, because the statute’s plain language 
and history make evident that enhanced voucher holders may 
not be evicted absent good cause, even at the end of a lease 
term.  We will therefore remand so that the District Court may 
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consider whether Harvey has good cause to evict under the 
circumstances of this case. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Background 
 In 1974, Congress created the Section 8 housing 
program “[f]or the purpose of aiding low-income families in 
obtaining a decent place to live.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a); 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 633, 662–66 (1974) (amending 
the United States Housing Act of 1937) (codified as amended 
at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f).  The program, which is funded by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) and 
administered by local public housing agencies (“PHAs”), 24 
C.F.R. § 982.1(a)(1), generally provides two different types of 
rental assistance: “project-based” subsidies and “tenant-based” 
subsidies.  Id. § 982.1(b)(1).   
 Project-based assistance is tied to specific housing 
developments or units.  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(6); 24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.1(b)(1).  Owners of such properties enter into long-term 
contracts with the applicable PHA, under which the owners 
agree to rent their properties to eligible low-income families 
and the PHA agrees to provide rental assistance payments to 
the owners on behalf of the assisted tenants.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(b); 24 C.F.R. §§ 983.202, 983.205.  The owners then 
enter into written leases with particular families for individual 
units.  See 24 C.F.R. § 983.256.   
 Tenant-based assistance, by contrast, is tied to a specific 
tenant family and travels with the family if it moves.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(f)(7); 24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b).  Tenant-based vouchers 
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may be used on rental units anywhere in the United States, so 
long as the unit is in the jurisdiction of a PHA that administers 
a voucher program.  24 C.F.R. § 982.1(b)(1).  Once the assisted 
family selects an eligible unit and the applicable PHA approves 
the tenancy, the PHA enters into a contract with the property 
owner, under which the PHA agrees to make rental assistance 
payments to the owner.  Id. § 982.1(b)(2).  Unlike long-term 
PHA contracts for project-based assistance, a PHA contract for 
tenant-based assistance can provide for a term as short as one 
year, and the contract covers only the single unit and the 
particular assisted family.  See id. §§ 982.1(b)(2), 982.309(a).  
But as with project-based assistance, in addition to the PHA 
contract, the property owner also enters into a written lease 
with the assisted family.  Id. § 982.308(b).   
 Under both project-based and tenant-based assistance, 
the assisted family contributes a prescribed amount toward the 
overall rental payment, generally equal to thirty percent of the 
tenant family’s monthly “adjusted income” or ten percent of its 
monthly gross income, whichever is greater.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(o)(2); see also id. § 1437a(a)(1).  The government 
pays the balance of the rent amount up to a statutorily capped 
amount known as the “payment standard,” which normally 
cannot exceed 110 percent of the fair market rental value for 
the property, as established by HUD.  See id. § 1437f(c), 
(o)(1)–(2). 
 In the late 1980s, many of the long-term, project-based 
assistance contracts between property owners and PHAs began 
to expire.  Concerned that property owners would decline to 
renew the contracts and force low-income tenants out by 
raising rents to rates that exceeded the statutory payment 
standard, Congress passed a number of laws intended to protect 
tenants in the event their landlords converted their subsidized 
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units to normal, market-based housing.  Among these measures 
was a notice requirement enacted as part of the Housing and 
Community Development Act of 1987.  See Pub L. No. 100-
242, § 262(a), 101 Stat. 1815, 1890 (1988) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(8)).  In its present iteration, 
this measure requires that owners provide tenants and HUD 
with at least one year’s notice before opting out of their project-
based assistance contracts.  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(8)(A).  
Owners “may not evict the tenants or increase the tenants’ rent 
payment until” the one-year period has elapsed.  Id. 
§ 1437f(c)(8)(B).   
 Roughly a decade later, as project-based contracts 
continued to expire, Congress enacted additional tenant 
protections through creation of the “enhanced voucher” 
program.  See Pub L. No. 106-74, 113 Stat. 1047, 1109–15, 
1121–24 (1999).  Whereas the notice requirement protects 
project-based tenants before their property owner’s long-term 
contract with the applicable PHA expires, enhanced vouchers 
come into play after the notice period has elapsed and the 
property owner has completed the process of opting out of the 
project-based assistance program.  HUD is statutorily required 
to provide enhanced vouchers to tenants who had previously 
been receiving project-based assistance, beginning on the date 
the owner’s project-based contract expires and is not renewed, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f note—a date that the statute refers to as 
the “eligibility event,” id. § 1437f(t)(2).    
 Enhanced vouchers are generally governed by the 
ordinary voucher provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o), except 
where modified by the enhanced voucher provision, § 1437f(t).  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1).  As originally passed in 1999, the 
enhanced voucher provision stated that  
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during any period that the assisted family 
continues residing in the same project in which 
the family was residing on the date of the 
eligibility event for the project, if the rent for the 
dwelling unit of the family in such project 
exceeds the applicable payment standard 
established pursuant to subsection (o) for the unit, 
the amount of rental assistance provided on behalf 
of the family shall be determined using a payment 
standard that is equal to the rent for the dwelling 
unit (as such rent may be increased from time-to-
time), subject to paragraph 10(A) of subsection 
(o) . . . . 
Pub L. No. 106-74, § 538(a), 113 Stat. at 1122.  Thus, unlike 
ordinary tenant-based and project-based vouchers, enhanced 
vouchers were designed to cover the difference between the 
tenant’s statutorily prescribed rent contribution and the rent 
amount set by the property owner after opting out of the 
project-based assistance program, id. § 1437f(t)(1)(B)—which 
is usually higher than the payment standard that would 
otherwise apply to ordinary project-based vouchers.  Indeed, 
the rent amount that the owner chooses to charge after opt-out 
is not subject to any specific limit and can be increased 
periodically.  It need only “be reasonable in comparison with 
rents charged for comparable dwelling units in the private, 
unassisted local market.”  Id. § 1437f(o)(10)(A). 
 Aside from the higher payment standard, enhanced 
vouchers are, in a sense, a hybrid of the two types of ordinary 
vouchers.  Like project-based vouchers, they are tied to the 
particular project; if the family moves out of that project, their 
enhanced voucher eligibility terminates.  See id. 
§ 1437f(t)(1)(C)(i).  Like tenant-based vouchers, enhanced 
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vouchers are tied to the particular assisted family; if the family 
attempts to transfer the voucher to a third party who was not 
residing in the unit on the date of the eligibility event, the 
family’s enhanced voucher eligibility, again, terminates, and 
the payment standard for the unit is determined pursuant to the 
ordinary voucher provision.  Id. § 1437f(t)(1)(C)(ii).   
 In 2000, Congress amended the enhanced voucher 
provision to add the language at the heart of this case.  See Pub 
L. No. 106-246, § 2801, 114 Stat. 511, 569 (2000) (codified at 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B)).  Importantly, the first clause of the 
provision was changed, and as a result, the provision in its 
current form now states that  
the assisted family may elect to remain in the 
same project in which the family was residing on 
the date of the eligibility event for the project, and 
if, during any period the family makes such an 
election and continues to so reside, the rent for 
the dwelling unit of the family in such project 
exceeds the applicable payment standard 
established pursuant to subsection (o) of this 
section for the unit, the amount of rental 
assistance provided on behalf of the family shall 
be determined using a payment standard that is 
equal to the rent for the dwelling unit (as such rent 
may be increased from time-to-time), subject to 
paragraph 10(A) of subsection (o) of this section 
and any other reasonable limit prescribed by the 
Secretary [of HUD], except that a limit shall not 
be considered reasonable for purposes of this 
subparagraph if it adversely affects such assisted 
families . . . . 
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42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (emphasis added).1 
B. Factual and Procedural Background 
 In 1982, Florence Hayes and her son Theodore moved 
into 538B Pine Street, a four-bedroom unit in a duplex built as 
part of Washington Square East, a project-based Section 8 
development located in the Society Hill neighborhood of 
Philadelphia.  A few years later, they were joined by Aqeela 
Fogle, Florence’s granddaughter and Theodore’s niece.  
Theodore moved out some time in the 1980s before moving 
back in 2003.  Florence and Fogle, however, never left.  
Florence lived in the unit until her death in 2015.  Fogle 
continues to live there, now with her three minor children.   
 In early 2008, the then-owners of Washington Square 
East, Pine Street Associates, decided not to renew their project-
based Section 8 contract with the Philadelphia Housing 
Authority upon its expiration on January 17, 2009.  Consistent 
with federal law, on January 9, 2008, Pine Street Associates 
notified the tenants of Washington Square East that it would 
not be renewing the contract.  The notification letter explained:  
                                                 
 1 The final two clauses of the provision were also added 
in 2000, through two subsequent amendments.  See Pub. L. No. 
106-377, § 1(a)(1), 114 Stat. 1441, 1441A-24 (Oct. 27, 2000) 
(inserting “and any other reasonable limit prescribed by the 
Secretary”); Pub L. No. 106-569, § 903(a), 114 Stat. 2944, 
3026 (Dec. 27, 2000) (inserting “except that a limit shall not 
be considered reasonable for purposes of this subparagraph if 
it adversely affects such assisted families”).   
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Federal law allows you to elect to continue living 
at this property provided that the unit, the rent 
and we, the owner, meet the requirements of the 
Section 8 tenant-based assistance program.  As 
an owner, we will honor your right as a tenant to 
remain at the property on this basis as along [sic] 
as it continues to be offered as rental housing, 
provided that there is no cause for eviction under 
Federal, State or local law.   
J.A. 636.  The Hayes family opted to remain in their unit, and, 
as a result, they began receiving enhanced voucher assistance 
after Pine Street Associates’ project-based contract expired in 
January 2009.   
 The following year, Pine Street Associates sold a parcel 
of three duplex houses to Philip Harvey—a parcel that included 
the Hayes family’s unit at 538 Pine Street.  Harvey 
subsequently signed a Housing Assistance Payment (“HAP”) 
contract with the Philadelphia Housing Authority and executed 
a one-year, Section 8 model lease with Florence Hayes, who at 
the time was designated head of the Hayes household.  The 
lease listed Florence and Theodore Hayes, Aqeela Fogle, and 
Fogle’s three minor children as the family members authorized 
to live in the unit.  The parties renewed the lease in 2011 and 
2013 for additional two-year terms, the second of which 
expired on April 30, 2015.   
 In February 2015, Florence Hayes passed away, and the 
Philadelphia Housing Authority transferred the head of 
household status to Theodore Hayes.  Two weeks later, Harvey 
sent the Hayes family a letter stating that he did not intend to 
renew their lease when it expired at the end of April, citing 
Florence Hayes’s passing and his desire to renovate the unit as 
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reasons for the nonrenewal.  Upon expiration of the lease, 
however, the Hayes family did not vacate the apartment, and 
on May 1, Harvey sent a second letter reiterating that he would 
not sign a new lease.  In this second letter, Harvey again 
provided Florence Hayes’s death and his plan to renovate as 
reasons for nonrenewal.  But Harvey also added a third reason: 
his intent to move his daughter into the apartment.  Harvey 
concluded the letter by stating that he would initiate eviction 
proceedings if the family did not move out within five days.   
 Theodore Hayes and Aqeela Fogle responded by filing 
suit in the District Court, seeking declaratory relief and an 
order enjoining Harvey from evicting them.  They argued that 
the enhanced voucher provision provided them with an 
enforceable right to remain in their unit.  As a result, Harvey 
could not evict the family without cause, and, according to 
them, Harvey’s stated reasons did not constitute good cause.  
Harvey, on the other hand, contended that he was not even 
bound by the enhanced voucher statute because he had never 
participated in the project-based program.  Alternatively, he 
argued that the statute did not create a right that was 
enforceable at the end of a lease term.   
 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, 
and the District Court ruled in favor of Harvey.  Hayes v. 
Harvey, 186 F. Supp. 3d 427 (E.D. Pa. 2016).  It reasoned that 
Harvey was bound by the enhanced voucher statute by virtue 
of the HAP contract and lease that he executed with the 
Housing Authority and the family, respectively, but that the 
statute did not require property owners to renew the leases of 
enhanced voucher holders.  Id. at 433–40.  Accordingly, 
Harvey was entitled to initiate proper eviction proceedings if 
the family did not vacate the premises within a reasonable 
period of time.  Id. at 440.  After Hayes and Fogle filed this 
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appeal, however, the District Court issued an injunction 
prohibiting Harvey from taking any measures to evict while the 
appeal was pending.   
II. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291—with 
one caveat.  While this appeal was pending, Theodore Hayes 
moved out of 538B Pine Street.  Because he no longer has “a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome” of the case, his 
claims are moot and we lack jurisdiction over them.  United 
Steel Paper & Forestry Rubber Mfg. Allied Indus. & Serv. 
Workers Int’l Union v. Virgin Islands, 842 F.3d 201, 208 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Cty. of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 
631 (1979)).  Aqeela Fogle still lives in the unit with her three 
children, though.  She has been processed as the new head of 
household and continues to be eligible to receive enhanced 
voucher assistance, because she resided in the unit on the date 
of the eligibility event, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1).  As a result, 
Fogle continues to have a concrete interest at stake, and an 
“occasion for meaningful relief” continues to exist.  United 
Steel Paper, 842 F.3d at 208 (quoting Rendell v. Rumsfeld, 484 
F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 2007)).  We therefore have jurisdiction 
over her claims, which are the same as those that were asserted 
by Hayes. 
 We exercise plenary review of a district court’s order 
granting summary judgment.  Goldenstein v. Repossessors 
Inc., 815 F.3d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 2016).  We will affirm if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 
170 (3d Cir. 2011), we conclude that “there is no genuine 
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dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).   
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Section 8 Statute’s Application to Harvey 
 As a threshold matter, Harvey argues that we should 
affirm the District Court on an alternative ground.  He 
contends, as he did below, that he is not bound by any of 
Section 8’s requirements because he purchased the property 
free and clear of encumbrances, without any deed restrictions 
or federal mortgage, and after the previous owner had already 
opted out of the Section 8 program.  We disagree—albeit for 
different reasons than those provided by the District Court.   
 The District Court concluded that Harvey was obligated 
to comply with the program’s requirements because he was “a 
party to a tenant-based HAP contract and related lease,” which 
were “governed by, and subject to, . . . the Section 8 statute.”  
Hayes, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 433.  But nothing in the enhanced 
voucher provision limits its effect to the original owner.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t).  Indeed, § 1437f(t)(1)(C) provides only 
two conditions under which enhanced voucher eligibility 
terminates: when the family moves and when the voucher is 
used by someone other than the original family.  Neither 
involves the opt-out owner’s sale of the property.  Although 
the Section 8 scheme is generally administered through the use 
of contracts and leases, nothing in the statute itself conditions 
its effect in all circumstances on common law devices.  
Accordingly, the enhanced voucher provision applies even to 
landlords who choose not to enter into HAP contracts.  See 
Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 
636 F.3d 1150, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that property 
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owners must respect eligible tenants’ statutory right to elect to 
remain even if they choose not to execute a HAP contract, 
thereby foregoing fair market rent via enhanced vouchers).   
 Here, of course, Harvey did enter into a HAP contract 
and lease, but that is of no moment for our present purposes.  
Harvey purchased a former project-based Section 8 property, 
where enhanced voucher tenants are currently residing.  By 
virtue of those facts alone, he falls within the scope of the 
Section 8 statute.2   
B. Enhanced Voucher Holders’ Right to “Elect to 
Remain”  
 1. The Statutory Text and History 
 Turning to whether the enhanced voucher provision 
requires property owners like Harvey to continuously renew 
                                                 
 2 Relatedly, Harvey argues that, irrespective of any 
tenant protections the Section 8 statute may provide, provisions 
of the HAP contract and lease permit him to evict the Hayes 
family pursuant to Pennsylvania law.  We need not examine 
the validity of this argument, because even if Harvey is correct 
as a matter of state law, “[t]he Supremacy Clause preempts any 
state law that ‘interferes with or is contrary to federal law.’”  
Zahner v. Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., 802 F.3d 497, 512 (3d 
Cir. 2015) (quoting Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962)).  
Thus, if the enhanced voucher provision provides eligible 
families a right to elect to remain that is enforceable against 
property owners at the end of a lease term, it would preempt 
the application, in this case, of any principles of Pennsylvania 
law that permit nonrenewal without cause.  
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enhanced voucher tenancies, we begin, as we do in all cases 
involving statutory interpretation, with the statute’s text.  Doe 
v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2016).  If the statutory 
language is unambiguous, our inquiry is ordinarily complete.  
Id.  We do not examine the language in isolation, however.  “A 
statutory provision is not ambiguous simply because ‘by itself, 
[it is] susceptible to differing constructions.’”  Disabled in 
Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Price, 370 F.3d 
362, 369 (3d Cir. 2004)).  Rather, in examining the statutory 
language, “we take account of ‘the specific context in which 
that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as 
a whole.’”  Id. (quoting In re Price, 370 F.3d at 369).      
 In relevant part, the current version of the enhanced 
voucher provision states:  
[T]he assisted family may elect to remain in the 
same project in which the family was residing on 
the date of the eligibility event for the project, 
and if, during any period the family makes such 
an election and continues to so reside, the rent for 
the dwelling unit of the family in such project 
exceeds the applicable payment standard 
established pursuant to [the ordinary voucher 
provision] for the unit, the amount of rental 
assistance provided on behalf of the family shall 
be determined using a payment standard that is 
equal to the rent for the dwelling unit . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B).  The District Court held that this 
provision does not impose any obligations on property owners.  
See Hayes, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 435.  Instead, according to the 
District Court, the provision merely “authorizes and requires 
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the [HUD] Secretary to provide a tenant who wishes to remain 
in a rental housing unit additional rental assistance.”  Id.  Thus, 
in the District Court’s view, the enhanced voucher provision 
does not grant eligible tenants any right enforceable against 
their landlords—much less one that applies at the end of a lease 
term.   
 We disagree.  The plain language of § 1437f(t)(1)(B)’s 
first clause, read in the context that it is used, does in fact 
provide enhanced voucher holders with a right that is 
enforceable against their landlords such that tenants may be 
evicted only for cause, even at the end of a lease term.  The 
remainder of the provision, which is not at issue in this suit, 
then establishes a higher payment standard applicable when 
voucher holders exercise that right.   
 Importantly, § 1437f(t)(1)(B)’s first clause is written 
from the tenant’s perspective, and it includes two verbs.  The 
first is “elect,” which means “to choose (a course of action) 
[especially] by preference.”  Webster’s Third New 
International Dictionary 731 (1976).  The second is “remain,” 
meaning “to stay in the same place or with the same person or 
group.”  Id. at 1919.  This right to “choose . . . by preference” 
to “stay in the same place” is not limited to any particular time 
period, and it is not directed to only HUD or any other specific 
party.  Thus, the assisted family’s right necessarily limits the 
ability of the property owner to evict.  If a landlord could 
simply ignore an eligible family’s choice to stay and force them 
to leave, the statutory right would be meaningless.   
 Likewise, the assisted family’s right would be 
meaningless if it were not enforceable at the end of a lease 
term.  Under such an interpretation, the first clause of 
§ 1437f(t)(1)(B) would simply reflect the baseline conditions 
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of landlord-tenant relations: During the term of their lease, 
tenants generally may not be evicted, absent some reason 
enumerated in the lease or authorized by law; at the end of their 
lease term, tenants may seek to renew their leases, as long as 
their landlords agree to do so.  Thus, if enhanced voucher 
holders’ right to “elect to remain” limited property owners’ 
rights during only the lease term, the first clause of the 
provision would have no independent meaning; it would 
describe what was already true.  It is, however, a well-
established canon of statutory interpretation that “statutes 
should be read to avoid making any provision ‘superfluous, 
void, or insignificant.’”  Milner v. Dep’t of the Navy, 562 U.S. 
562, 575 (2011) (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 
31 (2001)).   
 This canon is of particular importance where, as is true 
here, the relevant statutory text at issue was added by 
amendment.  “When Congress amends legislation, courts must 
‘presume it intends [the change] to have real and substantial 
effect.’”  Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1858 (2016) 
(alteration in original) (quoting Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 
(1995)).  In this case, the original iteration of § 1437f(t)(1)(B), 
enacted in 1999, did not include the first clause providing that 
eligible families “may elect to remain.”  It instead provided that 
the higher payment standard would apply “during any period 
that the assisted family continues residing in the same project 
in which the family was residing on the date of the eligibility 
event for the project.”  Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 538(a), 113 Stat. 
1047, 1122 (1999).  In other words, the 1999 version of the 
provision did not alter the baseline conditions of landlord-
tenant relations.  At the end of a lease term, it stated only that 
HUD would provide (through the applicable PHA) any 
additional required financial assistance if the assisted family 
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sought to remain in the unit and the property owner allowed 
the family to do so by agreeing to renew their lease.  
 But the very next year, in 2000, Congress replaced the 
above language with the current version of § 1437f(t)(1)(B)’s 
first clause, stating that “the assisted family may elect to 
remain in the same project in which the family was residing on 
the date of the eligibility event.”  Pub. L. No. 106-246, § 2801, 
114 Stat. 511, 569 (2000).  Our interpretation must effectuate 
that change, for it simply is not plausible that Congress 
amended the statute within one year of its initial enactment 
merely to set the scene differently.  By providing that eligible 
families “may elect to remain,” Congress must have given 
those families some right that they did not enjoy previously—
a right to choose to stay that their landlords must accept by 
continually renewing their leases.     
 According to both the Dissent and the District Court, 
however, the significance of the 2000 amendment is that it 
“obligates HUD to provide [tenants] the financial means to 
afford the increased rent” after their property owners opt out of 
the project-based program.  Dissenting Op. 6; see also Hayes, 
186 F. Supp. 3d at 435.  Put differently, in the Dissent’s 
estimation, the post-amendment version of § 1437f(t)(1)(B) 
provides two different protections: “[i]t not only protects 
against an early [lease] termination following an opt-out, but it 
also explicitly provides eligible enhanced-voucher tenants with 
a guarantee that HUD will provide them with an enhanced 
voucher.”  Dissenting Op. at 9 n.5.   
 The problem with this interpretation—aside from being 
an implausible reading of the provision’s plain language—is 
that eligible families already had an express guarantee that 
HUD would provide them with enhanced vouchers.  A separate 
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provision of the 1999 version of the statute already required 
HUD to do so.  See Pub. L. No. 106-74, § 531(a), 113 Stat. 
1047, 1113 (1999) (amending the Multifamily Assisted 
Housing Reform and Affordability Act of 1997, § 524(d)) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f note) (“In the case 
of a contract for project-based assistance under section 8 for a 
covered project that is not renewed . . . , upon the date of the 
expiration of such contract, the [HUD] Secretary shall make 
enhanced voucher assistance . . . available on behalf of each 
low-income family who, upon the date of such expiration, is 
residing in an assisted dwelling unit in the covered project.”).  
With respect to the other protection identified by the Dissent, 
enhanced voucher families were also already shielded from 
“early termination following an opt-out.”  Dissenting Op. at 9 
n.5.  As we said above, a property owner generally may not 
terminate a lease and evict a tenant during the lease term, 
absent some reason enumerated in the lease or authorized by 
law.  That is the baseline condition of the landlord-tenant 
relationship.   
 Thus, neither of the Dissent’s identified protections 
needed to be codified in 2000.  Because all of the relevant HUD 
obligations were covered by the 1999 version of the statute, 
adopting the Dissent’s construction would require us to 
conclude that Congress amended the statute in 2000 solely to 
repeat what the statute and common law already required.  
Such a conclusion fails to give the 2000 amendment any “real” 
or “substantial effect.”  Ross, 136 S. Ct. at 1858 (quoting Stone, 
514 U.S. at 397).       
 In rejecting our interpretation of the enhanced voucher 
provision, the District Court also expressed concern about 
“imposing any continued obligation on the owner to remain in 
the [Section 8] program” and subjecting the owner to “an 
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endless or perpetual lease.”  Hayes, 186 F. Supp. 3d. at 434–
35; see also Dissenting Op. at 2 n.1.  Examining the entire 
statutory scheme in context, however, makes evident that such 
concern is unwarranted.  For one, the statute provides that 
enhanced vouchers cannot be transferred to “any family other 
than the original family on behalf of whom the voucher was 
provided.”  42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(C)(ii).3  Additionally, any 
existing lease agreement or HAP contract will provide grounds 
for eviction.  Indeed, leases for enhanced voucher tenancies are 
statutorily required to include a “good cause” eviction clause.  
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1b(b)(3).  Further, regardless of whether a 
lease or HAP contract is in effect, the statutory provisions and 
regulations governing ordinary vouchers generally apply to the 
enhanced voucher program.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1).  
Thus, § 1437f(o)(7)(C), from the ordinary voucher subsection, 
applies and allows property owners to, at any time, terminate 
enhanced voucher tenancies “for serious or repeated violation 
of the terms and conditions of the lease, for violation of 
applicable Federal, State, or local law, or for other good 
cause.”4 
                                                 
 3 That is not to say the right to elect to remain may be 
transferred among, or passed down in perpetuity to, 
generations of family members.  Rather, as conceded by the 
Hayes family and confirmed by HUD, “original family” means 
only those family members on the lease at the time of the 
eligibility event.  Audio of Oral Arg. at 14:39-16:30; 50:25-
50:50.   
 4 That § 1437f(o)(7)(C) uses the phrase “during the term 
of the lease” does not make the subsection’s termination 
conditions inapplicable to enhanced voucher tenancies.  
Subsection (o)(7)(C) includes the “during the term of the lease” 
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 Nothing in the enhanced voucher provision’s “may elect 
to remain” language abrogates or forecloses application of 
these standards in the enhanced voucher context.  Accordingly, 
the 2000 amendment to the provision does not reflect 
congressional intent to subject property owners to perpetual 
leases.  Rather, it evidences congressional desire to strike a 
balance between the interests of tenants and those of property 
owners.  On the one hand, the enhanced voucher provision 
permits property owners who comply with the notice provision 
and opt out of the project-based program to raise rents to rates 
that exceed the payment standard applicable to ordinary tenant- 
or project-based vouchers.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B).  On 
the other hand, the enhanced voucher provision places a 
limitation on those property owners’ nonrenewal rights by 
requiring good cause before the owners may terminate a 
                                                 
language because ordinary, tenant-based voucher holders 
possess no right to elect to remain in their unit at the end of a 
lease term.  Therefore, in the context of ordinary vouchers, the 
need for cause only exists “during the term of the lease.”  But 
because the enhanced voucher statute provides a right to “elect 
to remain,” the requirements of § 1437f(o)(7)(C) apply to 
enhanced vouchers not only during the lease term, but also at 
the end of the term.  This interpretation of the statutory scheme 
is consistent with § 1437f(t)(1), which, as previously 
explained, states that enhanced vouchers are governed by the 
ordinary voucher provision, except where modified by the 
enhanced voucher provision.  In this context, the enhanced 
voucher provision modifies when the requirements of 
subsection (o)(7)(C) apply—that is, both during the term of the 
lease and at the end of the lease term—but it does not change 
the requirements themselves.   
23 
 
tenancy.  But for each owner, the number of tenancies to which 
the enhanced voucher good cause requirement applies will be 
fixed and relatively small, because enhanced vouchers are 
available to only families who were receiving project-based 
assistance on the date of the eligibility event, see 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1437f(t)(1)(C), (t)(2).   
 That Congress chose to enact such a compromise is 
unsurprising given its purpose for creating enhanced vouchers 
in the first place: “allow[ing] tenants to continue to maintain 
their homes where the owners of their rental units have raised 
rents after rejecting the renewal of project-based contracts.” S. 
Rep. No. 106-161, at 62 (1999).  Congress considered this goal 
“especially . . . important where the tenants [we]re elderly or 
persons with disabilities . . . [who] want[ed] to age in place.”  
Id.  Then, when Congress amended the enhanced voucher 
provision in 2000, it did so in order to “clarify[] that assisted 
families continue to have the right to elect to remain in the 
same unit of their project if that project is eligible to receive 
enhanced vouchers.”  H.R. Rep. No. 106-521, at 42–43 (2000); 
see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-710, at 164 (2000) (Conf. Report) 
(stating that amendment was meant to “clarify[] the intent” of 
the enhanced voucher provision).  
 These stated objectives merely confirm what the 
statutory text and history already make clear on their own.5  By 
                                                 
 5 After cautioning that “there is no need to wade into the 
quagmire of legislative history” here, Dissenting Op. at 10, the 
Dissent itself is ironically the one that pins its hopes on 
legislative history.  As we have explained, the plain language 
of § 1437f(t)(1)(B), when read in the context it is used, is alone 
sufficient to conclude that the District Court must be reversed.  
That said, it is true that “[w]hen the statutory language is 
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providing that assisted families “may elect to remain in the 
same project in which the family was residing on the date of 
the eligibility event,” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B), Congress 
intended to grant enhanced voucher tenants a right to choose to 
stay in their housing developments such that their landlords 
                                                 
unambiguous . . . we ordinarily do not consider statutory 
purpose or legislative history.”  Hesketh, 828 F.3d at 167.  
Here, we include a brief discussion of purpose and legislative 
history solely to demonstrate why Congress would have chosen 
to enact this particular language—to show that this is not a case 
where “literal application of the statute will produce a result 
demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.”  Id. 
(quoting In re Segal, 57 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 1995)).   
 The Dissent, on the other hand, leans heavily on the use 
of the word “clarify[]” in two committee reports—both of 
which we cite above—to conclude that the 2000 amendment 
was not meant to “substantively change” anything in the 
statute.  Dissenting Op. at 16.  Indeed, aside from those two 
reports, the legislative history the Dissent references relates to 
the 1999 statute, which we concede did not require property 
owners to renew the leases of enhanced voucher tenants.  Thus, 
those two committee reports appear to form the keystone of the 
Dissent’s contention that the 2000 amendment was intended to 
merely restate what the 1999 statute already required.  In cases 
like this, however, where the statutory language is 
unambiguous, we require far more than a single word used in 
two committee reports before we depart from the general 
presumption that “[w]hen Congress amends legislation, . . . it 
intends [the change] to have real and substantial effect.’”  Ross, 
136 S. Ct. at 1858 (last alteration in original) (quoting Stone, 
514 U.S. at 397).   
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may not evict them without cause, even at the end of a lease 
term.  In other words, the statutory language, when read in 
context, is unambiguous, and it forecloses the District Court’s 
interpretation.6  Absent good cause, Harvey must renew the 
Hayes family’s lease.   
 2. HUD’s Interpretative Guidance and the 
Decisions of Other Courts 
 Even if the enhanced voucher statute’s language were 
ambiguous, there would be an additional reason to reverse the 
District Court: through various guidance documents, HUD has 
                                                 
 6 We acknowledge that the right to elect to remain is 
tied, not to the particular unit, but to the “same project in which 
the family was residing on the date of the eligibility event.”  42 
U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  One would think, 
then, that at least under certain circumstances, property owners 
could arrange for an enhanced voucher family to move to 
another unit in the “same project” and still be in compliance 
with § 1437f(t)(1)(B).  Here, however, Harvey has not 
expressed a willingness to permit the Hayes family to move 
into another one of his apartments on Pine Street, so we need 
not address the question, and for practical purposes of this case, 
the inquiry is whether Harvey may evict the family from this 
particular unit without cause.  For the reasons we have just 
provided, we conclude that he may not.  We note too that this 
case does not present the question of whether the right to elect 
to remain survives a downstream sale of a unit that ceases to 
be part of a “multifamily housing project,” defined as 
“consist[ing] of not less than five dwelling units on one site,” 
24 C.F.R. § 241.500(d), because Harvey purchased three 
contiguous duplex houses, or six units.   
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long interpreted § 1437f(t)(1)(B) as requiring landlords to 
renew the leases of enhanced voucher holders unless there is 
good cause to terminate the tenancy.  Because these guidance 
documents lack the force of law, they do not warrant deference 
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984); they are, however, entitled 
to a degree of “respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 
U.S. 134 (1944).  Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 
287, 298 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Christensen v. Harris Cty., 
529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).  The Skidmore framework is a 
“sliding scale” approach, id. at 304, which “requires a court to 
assign a weight to an [agency interpretation] based on ‘the 
thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its 
reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade, if lacking power to control,’” id. at 295 (quoting 
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).  “‘[T]he most important 
considerations are whether the agency’s interpretation ‘is 
consistent and contemporaneous with other pronouncements of 
the agency and whether it is reasonable given the language and 
purpose of the Act.’”  Id. at 304 (quoting Del. Dep’t of Nat. 
Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 
259, 284 (3d Cir. 2012)).   
 Applying Skidmore here, HUD’s interpretation is 
entitled to considerable weight.  As we have already explained, 
the interpretation that property owners must renew enhanced 
voucher tenancies unless there is cause to evict is a reasonable 
one given the language and purpose of the statute.  Indeed, we 
think it is the only interpretation to which § 1437f(t)(1)(B) is 
susceptible, but if it were not, it would certainly be a reasonable 
construction of the provision.   
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 HUD also first announced its position 
contemporaneously with the 2000 amendment to 
§ 1437f(t)(1)(B).  The agency’s Section 8 Renewal Policy 
Guidance Document published in January 2001 provided: 
Tenants who receive an enhanced voucher have 
the right to remain in their units as long at [sic] 
the units are offered for rental housing . . . .  
Owners may not terminate the tenancy of a 
tenant who exercises this right to remain except 
for cause under Federal, State or local law. . . .  
This protection continues after the first lease 
term.  As long as the property is offered as rental 
housing, absent good cause to terminate [the] 
tenancy under Federal, State or local law and 
provided the PHA continues to find the rent 
reasonable, owners must continually renew the 
lease of an enhanced voucher family. 
U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Section 8 Renewal Policy: 
Guidance for the Renewal of Project-Based Section 8 
Contracts, § 11-3-B (Jan. 19, 2001).   
 In the nearly two decades since, HUD has never altered 
its interpretation, consistently reiterating the same view in 
subsequent guidance documents and notices issued to owners 
and PHAs.  See e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 
Section 8 Renewal Policy: Guidance for the Renewal of 
Project-Based Section 8 HAP Contracts, § 11-3-B (July 28, 
2017); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Section 8 Renewal 
Policy: Guidance for the Renewal of Project-Based Section 8 
Contracts, § 11-3-B (Nov. 5, 2015); Memorandum from 
Benjamin T. Metfcalf, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Multifamily 
Hous. Programs, to Multifamily Project Owners (June 5, 
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2014); Letter from Michael Dennis, Dir., Office of Hous. 
Voucher Programs, to Exec. Dirs., Public Hous. Agencies 
(May 22, 2014); U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., Section 8 
Renewal Policy: Guidance for the Renewal of Project-Based 
Section 8 Contracts, § 11-3-B (Feb. 15, 2008) [hereinafter 
2008 HUD Renewal Guide].  Indeed, rather than altering its 
position, HUD has sought to codify its interpretation through 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.  See Tenant-Based 
Assistance: Enhanced Vouchers, 81 Fed. Reg. 74,372, 74,374–
75 (Proposed Oct. 26, 2016).  That proposed regulation 
remains pending.7   
                                                 
 7 Over the years, the agency has expressed the same 
view in court filings as well, including an amicus brief filed in 
this case.  See Br. for U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. as 
Amicus Curiae at 11 (“Since § 1437f(t)(1)(B) was enacted in 
its current form in 2000, HUD has interpreted the provision as 
providing enhanced voucher tenants with a right to remain in 
their housing units, such that they may not be evicted at the end 
of a lease term absent good cause (assuming the relevant units 
continue to be offered as rental housing and remain otherwise 
eligible for rental assistance).”); see also Br. for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae at 9 & n.4, Barrientos v. 1801-1825 
Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2009) (No. 07-56697).  
That amicus brief is itself entitled to respect under Skidmore, 
“to the extent [it] ha[s] the power to persuade.”  Shuker v. Smith 
& Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d 760, 773 n.11 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 
693–94 (3d Cir. 2016)).   
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 Furthermore, HUD’s interpretation is owed 
considerable weight under Skidmore because of the agency’s 
“specialized experience” overseeing the complex housing 
assistance programs, and because of “the value of uniformity” 
in the management of those nationally applicable programs.  
De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(quoting United States v. Mead, 533 U.S. 218, 234–35 (2001)).   
 The risk of disuniformity is particularly high here, in 
fact, because the Ninth Circuit has already embraced HUD’s 
position.  In Park Village Apartment Tenants Association v. 
Mortimer Howard Trust, 636 F.3d 1150, 1156–57 (9th Cir. 
2011), the court held that § 1437f(t)(1)(B) provides enhanced 
voucher holders a right to elect to remain that is exercisable 
against property owners, such that, “absent just cause for 
eviction,” owners are “require[d] . . . to permit tenants to 
remain in the housing complex while paying only their 
statutorily prescribed portion of the rent.”  The attempted 
eviction in Park Village did not take place at the end of the 
lease term, so the Ninth Circuit had no need to expressly 
address property owners’ nonrenewal rights, but nothing in the 
court’s opinion limits § 1437f(t)(1)(B)’s application to lease 
terms.  To the contrary, the court explicitly concluded that 
HUD’s stance that “owners must continually renew the lease 
of an enhanced voucher family, absent good cause to terminate 
[the] tenancy,” id. at 1157 (quoting 2008 HUD Renewal 
Guide) (internal quotation marks omitted), was “entitled to a 
measure of respect” under the Skidmore framework, id. 
(quoting Barrientos v. 1801-1825 Morton LLC, 583 F.3d 1197, 
1214 (9th Cir. 2009)).  Thus, if we were to reject HUD’s 
position here and affirm the District Court, we would risk 
fracturing this national program.   
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 In sum, HUD’s interpretation is not entitled to outright 
deference, but, taking into account the most important 
considerations under Skidmore, it does warrant considerable 
weight.  The agency’s position is reasonable, longstanding, and 
consistent, and it was adopted contemporaneously with the 
relevant amendment of the statute.  The agency also has unique 
experience managing the housing assistance programs, and 
another circuit has already adopted the agency’s position.  
Thus, even if the statutory language were not sufficiently clear 
on its own, we would—treating HUD’s view as a thumb on the 
scale—still reverse the District Court.   
C. The Good Cause Requirement and the Resulting 
Statutory Gap 
 Our conclusion that § 1437f(t)(1)(B) provides the 
Hayes family a right to elect to remain in their apartment that 
is enforceable against Harvey does not resolve this case.  As 
we have explained, the statutory provisions governing ordinary 
vouchers generally apply to the enhanced voucher program.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1).  Accordingly, § 1437f(o)(7)(C), 
from the ordinary voucher subsection, allows property owners 
to, at any time, terminate enhanced voucher tenancies “for 
serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the 
lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law, or 
for other good cause.”   
 Up to this point, we have yet to focus on one critical 
question: what constitutes “other good cause” to terminate an 
enhanced voucher tenancy?  Unlike the previous issue 
regarding the “elect to remain” language, this question presents 
us with statutory ambiguity, for the Section 8 statute itself does 
not provide a definition of “other good cause.”  We are 
confronted, then, with a “statutory gap,” and “[f]illing [such] 
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gaps . . . involves difficult policy choices that agencies are 
better equipped to make than courts.”  Nat’l Cable & 
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 
(2005); see also Eid v. Thompson, 740 F.3d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“Under the familiar Chevron analysis . . . [i]f . . . the 
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the question at 
issue, we give ‘controlling weight’ to the agency’s 
interpretation unless it is ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly 
contrary to the statute.’” (quoting United States v. Geiser, 527 
F.3d 288, 292 (3d Cir. 2008)).   
 When it comes to ordinary tenant-based and project-
based vouchers, HUD has, through regulations, filled the gap.  
With regard to tenant-based assistance, the agency has 
determined that good cause  
may include, but is not limited to, any of the 
following examples:  
 
(i) Failure by the family to accept the offer of a 
new lease or revision; 
 
(ii) A family history of disturbance of neighbors 
or destruction of property, or of living or 
housekeeping habits resulting in damage to the 
unit or premises; 
 
(iii) The owner’s desire to use the unit for 
personal or family use, or for a purpose other 
than as a residential rental unit; or 
 
(iv) A business or economic reason for 
termination of the tenancy (such as sale of the 
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property, renovation of the unit, or desire to lease 
the unit at a higher rental). 
 
24 C.F.R. § 982.310(d)(1).8  The definition applicable to 
ordinary project-based vouchers, while generally the same, is 
narrower in that good cause for those vouchers “does not 
include a business or economic reason or desire to use the unit 
for an individual, family, or non-residential rental purpose.”  
Id. § 983.257(a).   
 HUD has not, however, promulgated a good cause 
regulation that governs enhanced vouchers, and it has issued 
no relevant guidance.  In fact, in its pending rulemaking 
regarding enhanced vouchers, the agency specifically 
requested comments on the subject.  See 81 Fed. Reg. at 
74374–75.  To be sure, the regulatory provisions applicable to 
ordinary vouchers can apply to enhanced vouchers.  See 42 
U.S.C. 1437f(t)(1).  But, as we have just explained, there are 
two different good cause regulations applicable to ordinary 
vouchers.  Neither the statute nor the regulations themselves 
say which, if any, of the two should apply to enhanced 
vouchers.   
 Complicating matters further is that the concept of good 
cause inherently requires a case-by-case inquiry.  Indeed, in 
issuing its good cause regulations, HUD has recognized that 
                                                 
 8 HUD’s regulation governing ordinary tenant-based 
vouchers also provides that “[d]uring the initial lease term, the 
owner may not terminate the tenancy for ‘other good cause’, 
unless the owner is terminating the tenancy because of 
something the family did or failed to do.”  24 C.F.R. 
§ 982.310(d)(2).    
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“[t]he good cause concept should be flexible,” and that it 
“should remain open to case by case determination by the 
courts.”  60 Fed. Reg. 34,660, 34,673 (July 3, 1995) (quoting 
49 Fed. Reg. 12,215, 12,233 (Mar. 29, 1984)).  The agency 
therefore stressed that its rule provides “key ‘examples’ of 
cases that may be good cause, but explicitly states that ‘other 
good cause’ is not limited to the listed examples.”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  In other words, the good cause 
determination is an inevitably fact-intensive inquiry, as “a 
comprehensive regulatory definition . . . is neither possible 
[n]or desirable.”  Id. (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. at 12,233).   
 Here, Harvey provided three different justifications for 
his nonrenewal of the Hayes family’s lease: (1) Florence 
Hayes’s death; (2) a plan to renovate the unit; and (3) his desire 
to move his daughter into the apartment.  The District Court 
did not reach the question of whether any of these justifications 
were legally sufficient, because it held that Harvey did not need 
good cause for nonrenewal.  As the good cause question may 
implicate critical, unresolved factual questions, summary 
judgment is inappropriate at this juncture, because we are 
unable to conclude that there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material fact.  See Fed R. Civ. P. 56(a).  We will therefore 
remand to the District Court so that it may consider in the first 
instance whether Harvey has good cause for nonrenewal under 
the circumstances of this case.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District 
Court’s order entering judgment in favor of Harvey and 
remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
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FISHER, dissenting. 
 
In the late 1990s, Congress recognized that an 
increasing number of owners were opting out of project-based 
assistance contracts, thereby putting hundreds of thousands of 
units of affordable housing at risk. Because HUD had 
repeatedly failed to address this opt-out problem, Congress 
passed legislation designed to compel HUD to act. Enhanced 
vouchers, which were a part of this legislation, offered property 
owners a carrot to continue renewing enhanced-voucher 
tenancies: market-rate rent. With its decision today, the 
majority takes this carrot and wields it like a stick, holding that 
property owners must continuously renew enhanced-voucher 
tenancies because such tenants supposedly have an enforceable 
“right to remain” in their units beyond the expiration of their 
lease term. Without any basis in the statutory text or history, 
the majority has converted Congress’s incentive into an edict. 
This so-called “right to remain” “may be a good idea, but it 
was not the idea Congress enacted into law.” MCI Telecomms. 
Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 232 (1994). I 
respectfully dissent.  
 
* * * 
 
Philip E. Harvey purchased 538 Pine Street free and 
clear of any impediments, encumbrances, liens, or restrictions. 
He entered into a contract with the Philadelphia Housing 
Authority and a related lease with the Hayes family for the 
four-bedroom apartment at 538B. The lease provided Harvey 
with sole discretion over renewal. J.A. 656 (“The Owner may 
offer the Tenant a new lease.”) (emphasis added). When the 
lease expired, Harvey notified the family that he did not intend 
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to renew it. Under the majority’s view, however, Harvey must 
continuously renew the Hayes family’s lease for as long as they 
wish to remain at 538B—provided he does not have good 
cause to evict. This supposed “right to remain” extends to 
anyone who was on the lease at the time of the opt-out. As a 
practical matter, given that three minor children were on the 
lease at the time of the opt-out, Harvey’s property will likely 
be tied up for decades.1 If Congress meant to create such a 
“right to remain,” it would have done so clearly. Because it did 
not, and because this Court is not a legislature, I disagree with 
the majority’s holding.   
This case turns on the meaning of four words—“may 
elect to remain”—added to 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) in 2000. 
Military Construction Appropriations Act, 2001, Pub. L. 106-
246 § 2801, 114 Stat. 511 (2000). From these four words, the 
majority infers an entirely new “right to remain” for enhanced-
voucher tenants, enforceable against their landlords. The 
majority’s reasoning is flawed on several fronts. It largely 
analyzes these four words in isolation, rather than in their 
proper context; it mistakenly construes the provision as being 
directed at property owners, when it is actually directed at the 
relationship between HUD and assisted tenants; and it ignores 
the fact that if Congress meant to so expansively alter property 
                                              
1 I acknowledge that this is not a “perpetual lease” in the 
sense that it can be terminated in limited instances. And I 
acknowledge that the only family eligible for the enhanced 
voucher is the family who was on the lease at the time of the 
opt-out. Still, the majority has, in essence, conferred on the 
Hayes family a life estate at 538B Pine Street—notably, one 
that extends multiple generations. In other words, the majority 
has tied up Harvey’s property for however many years—or 
decades—the Hayes family chooses to reside there.  
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law, it would have done so clearly. It also overlooks the basic 
design of the enhanced voucher program as an incentive-based 
program, not a compulsory one.  
 
I. Statutory text 
 
Like the majority, I begin with the statute’s text. 
Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001). 
If the “language is plain and unambiguous, further inquiry is 
not required.” Id. In determining whether the language is “plain 
and unambiguous,” we examine “the language itself, the 
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader 
context of the statute as a whole.” Id. (quoting Marshak v. 
Treadwell, 240 F.3d 184, 192 (3d Cir. 2001)). A proper reading 
of the statute reveals that it is directed not at property owners, 
but at HUD and assisted tenants, and that the program was 
designed to incentivize—rather than compel—owners to 
renew enhanced-voucher tenancies.  
The “may elect to remain” language at issue was added 
to § 1437f(t)(1)(B) in 2000 via amendment.2 The current 
provision states that 
the assisted family may elect to 
remain in the same project in 
which the family was residing on 
the date of the eligibility event for 
the project, and if, during any 
                                              
2 That this key language was buried within a “Military 
Construction Appropriations Act,” without any explanation, is 
perhaps another clue that Congress did not intend to create a 
new substantive right that would force property owners to 
continuously renew enhanced-voucher tenancies.   
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period the family makes such an 
election and continues to so reside, 
the rent for the dwelling unit of the 
family in such project exceeds the 
applicable payment standard . . . , 
the amount of rental assistance 
provided on behalf of the family 
shall be determined using a 
payment standard that is equal to 
the rent for the dwelling unit (as 
such rent may be increased from 
time-to-time), subject to paragraph 
10(A) of subsection (o) of this 
section and any other reasonable 
limit prescribed by the [HUD] 
Secretary, except that a limit shall 
not be considered reasonable for 
purposes of this subparagraph if it 
adversely affects such assisted 
families . . . . 
42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) (emphasis added). 
The majority bases its sweeping view of the enhanced 
voucher statute on these four words—“may elect to remain”—
which it largely reads in isolation. Indeed, despite repeatedly 
acknowledging that a statute must be examined in context, the 
majority never attempts to examine the key four words within 
the context of the enhanced voucher provision, let alone the 
“broader context of the statute as a whole.” Rosenberg, 274 
F.3d at 141 (quoting Marshak, 240 F.3d at 192). By failing to 
read these words in context, the majority incorrectly 
determines that this provision is somehow directed at property 
owners. Then, based on this incorrect premise, the majority 
infers a “right to remain” because if an assisted family “may 
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elect to remain,” then that must impose a corresponding 
obligation on property owners to continuously renew an 
enhanced-voucher tenancy. There is no basis in the text to 
support this inferential leap.   
The language—“the assisted family may elect to 
remain”—does not plainly restrict a property owner’s 
nonrenewal rights. Indeed, nothing in the clause, nor the entire 
subsection, even mentions property owners. As the majority 
notes, there are two key verbs: “elect” and “remain.” “Elect” 
means “to make a selection of . . . to choose . . . especially by 
preference.” Elect, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elect (last 
visited July 31, 2018). “Remain” means “to stay in the same 
place or with the same person or group.” Remain, Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/remain (last visited July 25, 2018). 
Thus, what this clause plainly states is that an assisted tenant 
can “make a selection” or “choose” to “stay in the same place.” 
But for how long? One year? Five years? For life? Choosing to 
stay is plainly different than having a right or entitlement to 
stay. The majority, however, conflates the two and infers a 
corresponding obligation on property owners.  
When viewing the language first in the proper context 
of § 1437f(t)(1)(B), it is evident that “may elect to remain” has 
nothing to do with property owners, but is rather directed at 
HUD and assisted tenants. The provision explains what tenants 
must do to maintain eligibility, and that a tenant’s “elect[ion] 
to remain” is the triggering mechanism that initiates HUD’s 
obligation under the provision. It works as follows. After a 
valid opt-out, an assisted family can “elect to remain” in the 
same project. If the post-opt-out rent exceeds the payment 
standard, then the assisted family’s rent is calculated as 
specified by the statute. But how can the assisted family be 
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assured that HUD will provide them with an enhanced voucher 
to afford the increased rent?3 Enter § 1437f(t)(1)(B), which 
obligates HUD to provide the financial means to afford the 
increased rent. In other words, it makes their election to remain 
meaningful.4 This is the key feature of the enhanced voucher 
program—namely that HUD is required to provide an 
enhanced voucher to an eligible tenant, once they “elect to 
remain.”  
What this provision does not do is impose a duty on a 
landlord to continuously renew such a lease beyond its natural 
expiration date. The majority infers such a duty, reasoning that 
                                              
3 As discussed in Part II, infra, there is ample evidence 
suggesting that Congress was concerned with HUD’s failure to 
act despite the threat of increasing opt-outs. Thus, it enacted 
these provisions to compel HUD to act—not to compel 
property owners.   
4 As the panel stated before the grant of rehearing en 
banc: 
In our view, through the 2000 amendment 
Congress intended to make clear that, following 
a valid opt-out, HUD could not force an assisted 
family to leave the unit and that the family’s 
enhanced vouchers must be credited toward their 
rental obligations. . . . But after a rental 
agreement naturally expires, so too do the 
attendant rental obligations. At that point, the 
statute goes silent. Nothing in its text explicitly 
or impliedly obligates property owners to 
continuously renew enhanced-voucher 
tenancies.  
Hayes v. Harvey, 874 F.3d 98, 106 n.3 (3d Cir.), reh’g en banc 
granted, judgment vacated, 878 F.3d 446 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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otherwise, the family’s choice under the statute would be 
meaningless. Under the majority’s novel reasoning, a “right” 
is “meaningless” unless it makes the right-holder’s objective 
not only possible, but perfectly assured. It follows, I suppose, 
that if a foundation guarantees a full college scholarship to a 
high school student, this is “meaningless” because no college 
is required to offer the student admission. Nonsense. When 
there are multiple parties involved in a transaction, a guarantee 
to one party is not meaningless, in any sense, even if it does 
not bind all parties. The right conferred in § 1437f(t)(1)(B) is 
the right to have HUD increase the level of assistance to match 
the market-rate rent set by the now-opted-out property owner. 
And this is far from a token assurance—without the enhanced 
voucher program, tenants like the Hayes family often would be 
unable to afford market-rate rent following an opt-out.  
The majority also fails to view the language in the 
context of the entire statute. If Congress meant to direct any 
part of the enhanced voucher statute at property owners, it 
would have done so in unambiguous terms, as it does 
elsewhere. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(B) (“owner shall offer 
leases to tenants under this subsection”); § 1437f(o)(7)(C) 
(“owner shall not terminate”); § 1437f(o)(13)(G) (“may 
obligate the owner”); § 1437f(o)(13)(J) (“The owner . . . shall 
not admit any family to a dwelling . . . other than a family 
referred by the public housing agency from its waiting list.”); 
§ 1437f(cc)(2)(B) (“require the owner to submit an application 
for those rent requirements”). So within the context of the 
overall statute, it is evident that § 1437f(t)(1)(B) has nothing to 
do with property owners. 
Read in context, these four words—“may elect to 
remain”—simply cannot bear the weight the majority heaps 
upon them. As the Supreme Court has noted, Congress “does 
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in 
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vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might 
say, hide elephants in mouseholes.” Whitman v. Am. Trucking 
Associations, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). Creating a new, 
enforceable “right to remain,” however, would certainly be an 
alteration of a “fundamental detail[] of [this] regulatory 
scheme”—an elephant hiding in a mousehole. Id.   
The question then becomes: what does “may elect to 
remain” mean? After all, it must mean something, given that a 
“statute should be construed to give effect to all its provisions, 
so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or 
insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 
(2009) (quoting Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004)). 
Likewise, “[w]hen Congress acts to amend a statute, we 
presume it intends its amendment to have real and substantial 
effect.” Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 397 (1995). The answer is 
that the language provides enhanced-voucher recipients with a 
guarantee that they will not be evicted, during their lease term, 
by a landlord who refuses to accept enhanced vouchers as part 
of their rental payment. As the Ninth Circuit explained: 
The statute gives “assisted families” the right “to 
remain in the same project.” The statute also 
authorizes owners to raise their rents to a 
reasonable market rate and to receive a housing 
assistance payment, by means of an enhanced 
voucher, to cover the authorized increases in 
rent. It does not authorize owners to raise their 
rents to a reasonable market rate, but then to 
refuse to accept payment by means of an 
enhanced voucher, and evict an “assisted family” 
for nonpayment of rent. Practically, the statute 
requires owners to permit tenants to remain in the 
housing complex while paying only their 
statutorily prescribed portion of the rent. 
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Park Vill. Apartment Tenants Ass'n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 
636 F.3d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Feemster v. BSA 
L.P., 548 F.3d 1063, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“One thing that 
[the landlord] may not do, however, is refuse to accept payment 
by voucher and then contend that eviction is warranted for 
nonpayment of rent.”). This is a consequential protection; it 
does not render the language superfluous or meaningless.5 This 
protection cannot, however, extend in perpetuity beyond the 
contractual relationship between the landlord and the assisted 
tenant.   
  Given that nothing in the enhanced voucher statute 
speaks to nonrenewal, we must look to the ordinary voucher’s 
termination provision, which provides that “during the term of 
the lease, the owner shall not terminate the tenancy except for 
                                              
5 Nor does this merely “reflect the baseline conditions 
of landlord-tenant relations.” Maj. Op. at 17–18. It not only 
protects against an early termination following an opt-out, but 
it also explicitly provides eligible enhanced-voucher tenants 
with a guarantee that HUD will provide them with an enhanced 
voucher. The majority finds my reading “implausible” because 
the 1999 version of the statute contained a similar provision. 
But in its single-minded quest to give the 2000 amendment 
“independent meaning,” the majority ignores everything 
else—the plain language of the text, the context in which the 
language is used, the broader context of the overall statute, and 
the fact that Congress does not alter fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms. Indeed, had Congress meant 
to radically alter property rights in the way my colleagues do 
today, it would have done so clearly. What is “implausible,” 
then, is the inferential leap the majority must take to arrive at 
its conclusion.  
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serious or repeated violation of the terms and conditions of the 
lease, for violation of applicable Federal, State, or local law, or 
for other good cause.” 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(o)(7)(C) (emphasis 
added). Under the plain language of this provision, Harvey’s 
termination rights were limited “during the term of the [Hayes 
family’s] lease.” Id. After the lease term expires, so do these 
protections. Of course, Harvey had an incentive to renew the 
Hayes family’s lease, given that he was receiving market-rate 
rent. And, indeed, he did renew the lease multiple times. But 
nothing compels him to do so continuously.   
 
II. Statutory history 
 
The foregoing analysis of the statutory text is sufficient 
to conclude that there is no “right to remain” beyond the 
expiration of the initial lease term. Thus, there is no need to 
wade into the quagmire of legislative history.6 The majority 
                                              
6 The majority suggests that I “pin[ my] hopes on 
legislative history.” Maj. Op. at 23 n.5. I do not; the plain 
language of the statute is sufficient to affirm the District Court. 
Indeed, where—as here—the statutory text is unambiguous, 
there is generally no need to consider statutory purpose or 
legislative history. Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 
2016). Further inquiry is warranted only in “rare 
circumstances” where a “literal application of the statute will 
produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its 
drafters . . . or where the result would be so bizarre that 
Congress could not have intended it.” Id. (quoting In re Segal, 
57 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 1995)). I agree with the majority that 
this is not such a “rare circumstance[].” Id. But the majority’s 
reading of the statute results in such an outcome—one that is 
“so bizarre that Congress could not have intended it.” Id. The 
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does, however, and its analysis reflects some of the common 
pitfalls associated with such an undertaking. I examine the 
legislative history to highlight those errors, and to show that 
the history is not only consonant with our interpretation of the 
statute—it compels it.  
Legislative history can sometimes be a useful tool, but 
it must be deployed with care. Compare Digital Realty Tr., Inc. 
v. Somers, 138 S. Ct. 767, 783 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the Court’s 
attempt to derive a supposed “purpose” from a single Senate 
Report is flawed, because “[e]ven assuming a majority of 
Congress read the Senate Report” and “agreed with it,” we 
must still look at what was actually enacted because “we are a 
government of laws, not of men”), with id. at 782–83 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that legislative history can 
“aid us in our understanding of a law” and that “even when . . 
. a statute’s meaning can clearly be discerned from its text, 
consulting reliable legislative history can still be useful, as it 
enables us to corroborate and fortify our understanding of the 
text”).  
The point of contention here is the same as in Digital 
Realty Trust: selective quotation of a limited number of 
legislative reports to divine Congressional intent, while 
ignoring more compelling evidence. See Maj. Op. at 23 (citing 
S. Rep. No. 106-161 (1999), and H.R. Rep. No. 106-521 
(2000)). In focusing on these reports, the majority overlooks 
the overall purpose behind the enhanced voucher provision, 
and the means by which Congress sought to achieve that 
purpose. A proper analysis of the statutory history reveals two 
key points: first, that the enhanced voucher provisions are 
                                              
legislative history discussed in this section merely reinforces 
this notion.  
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clearly directed at HUD—not property owners—because of 
HUD’s repeated failure to confront the impending opt-out 
problem; and second, that Congress intended the enhanced 
voucher provision to act as a market-based tool to 
incentivize—not force—property owners to renew leases of 
enhanced voucher holders.   
At the outset, I note where I agree with the majority. I 
agree that one of the main purposes of the enhanced voucher 
provision was to “allow tenants to continue to maintain their 
homes where the owners of their rental units have raised rents 
after rejecting the renewal of project-based contracts.” S. Rep. 
No. 106-161, at 62 (1999); Maj. Op. at 23. I also agree that this 
goal “especially is important where the tenants are elderly or 
persons with disabilities, and want to age in place.” S. Rep. No. 
106-161, at 62 (1999). I further acknowledge that the opt-out 
problem was a real one—reliable studies showed that 500,000 
units of affordable housing could have been at risk in the 
following years due to increasing opt-outs. 145 Cong. Rec. 
22850 (Majority Staff, Marking up to Market: Renewing 
Section 8 Contracts and the Problem of Owner “Opt Outs,” 
June 23, 1999). Likewise, I agree that the enhanced voucher 
provision shows that Congress wanted to strike a balance 
between tenants’ and landlords’ interests. The problem, which 
the statutory history reveals, is that the majority strikes a 
balance that Congress clearly did not.   
Although the majority correctly notes Congressional 
desire to allow tenants to maintain their homes, it wholly 
ignores another major factor prompting the legislation; 
Congress was concerned with HUD’s inaction regarding the 
looming threat of increasing opt-outs. Section 8 Housing: 
Hearing Before the Sen. Subcomm. on Hous. and Transp., 
106th Cong. (1999), 1999 WL 492964 (written testimony of 
Rep. Rick Lazio, Chairman, H. Subcomm. Hous. & Cmty.) 
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(explaining that “Congress must act,” because “[f]or the last 18 
months, HUD has had broad authority to prevent opt-outs and 
the loss of affordable housing,” but has failed to act); 145 
Cong. Rec. 22850 (majority Staff, Marking up to Market: 
Renewing Section 8 Contracts and the Problem of Owner “Opt 
Outs,” June 23, 1999) (noting that “HUD has failed to offer or 
develop anything resembling a comprehensive approach to 
solving the opt-out problem,” and that “many in the advocacy 
community and some legislators expressed belief that 
encouraging nonrenewals was an intentional policy choice [by 
HUD].”). Indeed, even the Senate Report the majority cites 
reveals that, in order to achieve the stated goal of allowing 
assisted tenants to remain in their homes, Congress was 
authorizing HUD to act, as opposed to imposing any obligation 
on landlords. S. Rep. No. 106-161, 62 (“[a]uthoriz[ing] HUD 
to provide . . . enhanced vouchers” for this purpose, and 
instructing “HUD [to] make every effort to renew expiring 
section 8 project-based contracts before making [enhanced] 
vouchers available”). All of this further suggests that the 
majority’s reading of 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(t)(1)(B) is based on an 
incorrect premise—that it somehow is directed at the landlord-
tenant relationship. On the contrary, this history makes clear 
(as does the statute itself) that the enhanced voucher provision 
is directed at the relationship between HUD and assisted 
tenants.  
Next, although the enhanced voucher provision reflects 
congressional intent to strike a balance between landlords’ and 
tenants’ interests, the majority imposes a far different balance. 
Specifically, nothing in the legislative history suggests that 
Congress ever meant to force owners, like Harvey, to 
continuously renew enhanced-voucher tenancies, absent good 
cause to end the lease. Rather, the enhanced voucher program 
was clearly designed as a market-based solution that would 
14 
 
incentivize and encourage owners to continue renewing 
enhanced-voucher tenancies. See 145 Cong. Rec. 22848 
(statement of Rep. Rick Lazio, Chairman, H. Subcomm. Hous. 
and Cmty.) (“[W]hat we have done with this bill is . . . create 
the right incentive for owners to ensure the continuity of 
allowing the seniors, the disabled . . . to continue to live . . . 
there.”) (emphasis added)7; id. (statement of Rep. Barney 
Frank) (“[O]wners ought not to drop out. No one can say I am 
driven economically to drop out. . . . No one is going to be 
asked to lose money by staying in the program. We cannot take 
away their legal right to get out; we can diminish their 
financial incentive to get out.”) (emphasis added).  
Numerous contemporaneous statements corroborate 
this view of the Section 8 enhanced voucher program. HUD 
Section 8 opt-out crisis: Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Housing and Transportation of the Committee on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 106th Cong. (July 1, 1999), 1999 
WL 492966 (testimony of Sen. John Kerry) (“[T]he new HUD 
policy largely meets the concerns of the owners of section 8 
housing. Now, I ask these owners to hold up their side of the 
bargain and agree to accept the new, higher rents and stay in 
the program. I understand that it can be difficult at times to 
work with HUD. Still, the Department has come far, far more 
                                              
7 These statements were made in support of H.R. 202, 
portions of which were incorporated into H.R. 2684, which 
become Public Law No. 106–74, the 1999 version of the 
enhanced voucher statute. See H.R. Rep. No. 106–379, at 169 
(1999) (“Title V combines certain provisions from . . . H.R. 
202. . . .”). Rep. Lazio’s statements, in particular, have been 
cited by several courts, including this one. See, e.g., Park Vill. 
Apartment Tenants Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 
1150, 1163–64 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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than half way. We should expect the owners to take the last 
step and continue in the program.”) (emphasis added); see also 
id. (testimony of William C. Apgar, Assistant Sec. HUD), 1999 
WL 492965 (“HUD’s multifamily subsidies were always 
intended as market-driven programs dependent on the private 
sector to provide affordable housing.”). 
In other words, Congress identified a problem: HUD’s 
failure to act despite the threat of impending opt-outs. To 
combat this problem, Congress enacted a solution: compelling 
HUD to make up the difference between what assisted families 
could pay and market-rate rents. This solution struck the 
appropriate balance between tenants’ interests and landlords’ 
interests. This balance, however, never included forcing 
landlords to continuously renew enhanced-voucher tenancies 
after the leases expired on their own terms. Rather, the balance 
was that Congress would compel HUD to provide enhanced 
vouchers to eligible tenants; this, in turn, provided property 
owners with the proper incentive—market-rate rent—to 
continue renewing enhanced-voucher tenancies. Of course, if 
a property owner decided not to renew an enhanced-voucher 
tenancy, then nothing in the statute could, or would, require 
him to do so. After all, an incentive is not an edict.  
  Admittedly, much of the foregoing discussion pertains 
to the earlier version of the enhanced voucher statute. But that 
context is critical, especially given the complete dearth of 
information regarding the 2000 amendment. Indeed, the only 
explanation provided for the insertion of the “may elect to 
remain” language at issue here is that it was added to “clarify[] 
that assisted families continue to have the right to elect to 
remain in the same unit of their project if that project is eligible 
to receive enhanced vouchers.” H.R. Rep. No. 106-521, 42–43 
(2000) (emphasis added); see also H.R. Rep. No. 106-710, at 
164 (2000) (Conf. Report) (noting that the amendment was 
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intended to “clarif[y] the intent” of the enhanced voucher 
provision).  
This reveals another major flaw in the majority’s 
reasoning. Clarify, after all, means “to make understandable,” 
or “to free of confusion.” Clarify, Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/clarify (last visited July 25, 2018). 
Thus, according to the legislative history the majority relies on, 
the purpose of the 2000 amendment was simply to make the 
1999 version “understandable”—not to substantively change 
it.8 Undoubtedly, the creation of an entirely novel, judicially 
enforceable “right to remain,” which radically alters property 
rights, is a substantive change. Deriving this right entirely from 
the 2000 amendment, as the majority does, cannot be correct.    
 
III. Other considerations 
 
 The majority suggests that HUD’s interpretive 
guidance, as well as the decisions of other courts, provide 
further support for its conclusions. I disagree.  
 Through policy guidance, HUD has purported to extend 
§ 1437f(o)(7)(C)’s midterm limitations to nonrenewals of 
enhanced-voucher tenancies. See, e.g., HUD Section 8 
Renewal Policy, Ch. 11, ¶ 11-3(B) (2017) (stating that 
“[o]wners may not terminate the tenancy of a tenant who 
                                              
8 There is a meaningful difference between a 
clarification and a substantive change. See Napotnik v. 
Equibank & Parkvale Sav. Ass’n, 679 F.2d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 
1982). Of course, “we are constrained to give effect to the 
statutory language actually enacted.” Id.  
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exercises this right to remain except for cause” and that 
“[o]wners must continually renew the lease of an enhanced 
voucher family”). As the majority correctly notes, these 
documents lack the force of law, and are therefore not accorded 
deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Rather, they are 
entitled to a “degree of respect” under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 
323 U.S. 134 (1944), but only to the extent that HUD’s 
interpretation has the “power to persuade.” Christensen v. 
Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000) (quoting Skidmore, 323 
U.S. at 140). I am not persuaded. 
Some of the “most important considerations are whether 
the agency’s interpretation ‘is consistent and contemporaneous 
with other pronouncements of the agency.’” Hagans v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 298 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting 
Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs, 685 F.3d 259, 284 (3d Cir. 2012)). Admittedly, HUD’s 
policy guidance was first issued contemporaneously with the 
2000 amendment and has been consistent. In addition, HUD 
has “relative expertise,” id. at 305, in administering the 
statutory scheme. But expertise and consistency do not alone 
require deference. We must also consider whether HUD’s 
interpretation “is reasonable given the language and purpose of 
the [statute],” id. at 304, “the thoroughness evident in [HUD’s] 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning . . . and all those 
factors that give it the power to persuade, if lacking the power 
to control.” Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 
1352 (2015) (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). Here, 
HUD’s statement that “[o]wners must continually renew the 
lease of an enhanced voucher tenancy,” is contained in one 
paragraph of HUD’s nearly 200-page Section 8 Renewal 
Guidebook. HUD Section 8 Renewal Policy, Ch. 11, ¶ 11-3(B) 
(2017). Nowhere in this guidance does HUD explain the 
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reasoning behind its interpretation, and therefore we cannot 
discern the thoroughness of its consideration, nor the “validity 
of its reasoning.” Young, 135 S. Ct at 1352 (quoting Skidmore, 
323 U.S. at 140). And, most importantly, HUD’s interpretation 
is not supported by the statute’s text and history. Accordingly, 
HUD’s interpretation lacks “the power to persuade.” Id.  
 Decisions of other courts do not alter this conclusion. I 
acknowledge that, in the framework of non-
binding Skidmore deference, HUD’s interpretation may be 
entitled to some degree of deference given the “value of 
uniformity.” United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 
(2001) (citing Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140). Contrary to the 
majority’s view, however, there is no uniformity problem here. 
In fact, no other Court of Appeals has weighed in on the issue 
of non-renewal after the expiration of a lease term. Instead, our 
sister Circuits’ decisions have only addressed situations where 
a landlord sought to evict an enhanced-voucher tenant during 
the lease term for nonpayment reasons. See Park Vill., 636 F.3d 
at 1156 (“[The statute] does not authorize owners to raise their 
rents to a reasonable market rate, but then to refuse to accept 
payment by means of an enhanced voucher, and evict an 
‘assisted family’ for nonpayment of rent.”); Feemster, 548 
F.3d at 1069 (“One thing that [the landlord] may not do, 
however, is refuse to accept payment by voucher and then 
contend that eviction is warranted for nonpayment of rent.”). I 
agree with Park Village and Feemster insofar as they address 
the actual issues before those courts. In other words, there is no 
risk of non-uniformity, nor is there the potential for a circuit 
split.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
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The proper role of the judiciary is to “apply, not amend, 
the work of the People’s representatives.” Henson v. Santander 
Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1726 (2017). Today, the 
majority oversteps that role by crafting an enforceable “right 
to remain” that finds no support in the statutory text or history. 
I respectfully dissent.   
